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Stock Prices and Resignation of Members
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In this paper we provide an empirical analysis of announcements of res-
ignation of board members using data which comes from the Warsaw
Stock Exchange. Themarket reaction to this information is tested at dif-
ferent time horizons by means of event study methodology. The results
show that market reaction is rather positive immediately before the
announcement release and negative over the following six-day-period
starting on the event day. A possible explanation for this phenomenon
is suggested. Besides the traditional examination of abnormal return
behaviour, we also check whether or not resignation announcements
induce increases in the variance of stock returns over the period un-
der consideration. It turns out that a tendency towards increased stock
return volatility can be observed in the whole period prior to the an-
nouncement release.
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Introduction
Stock price reactions to announcements of managerial resignations have
been investigated by many researchers. Part of this research focuses on
forced resignations. Forced resignations are relatively rare and are due
more often to external factors like blockholder pressure or takeover at-
tempts, than to normal internal monitoring. According to economic the-
ory internal control mechanisms are eﬀective if there aremore changes of
top management in poorly performing firms than in firms whose perfor-
mance is good. Moreover improvements can be observed in firms’ per-
formance after top management changes. In general, identifying forced
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departures is diﬃcult, because press reports do not describe them as
such. Sometimes e. g. a departure announced as a retirement may be in
reality a forced resignation.
However, if a newspaper release states that a resignation is forced, or
that it results from the poor performance of a company, a researcher can
take it for granted that the change is really forced. In order to build a
data set of forced departures, one has to identify the properties of forced
resignations. Then resignations which share these properties can be clas-
sified as forced resignations even if those are not announced as such. The
interpretation of event study eﬀects of a resignation is not easy; a man-
agement change may signal diﬀerent things: that a firm’s performance is
worse than expected, or that a firm’s performance will improve as a re-
sult of the management change but also that the firm is considered as a
takeover target. In addition, top management changes can be probably
partially anticipated by taking into account poor performance before the
change.
Based on the forced managerial turnover data from the us stock mar-
ket, Furtado and Rozeﬀ (1987) found increases in stock prices due to the
event, but from a statistical point of view this result was insignificant.
Unlike Furtado and Rozeﬀ (1987), Worell, Davidson, and Glascock (1993)
documented a statistically significant price increase of 2.3%. A very in-
teresting work is that of Weisbach (1988), who reported that, on the one
hand, there is no price impact if the managerial resignation takes place
in a company whose board is dominated by executive directors. On the
other hand, there is a significant positive stock price reaction if the ma-
jority of the board consists of external, independent directors.
Khanna and Poulsen (1995) examine whether management turnover
leads to improvement in firms’ performance. They argue that remov-
ing poorly performing managers is an important step toward maximiz-
ing shareholder wealth. A management board must identify poor man-
agement and attract superior replacement managers. This is the main
criterion of the eﬀectiveness of internal monitoring. However a neg-
ative correlation between prior stock price trends and managements
turnover may coexist with eﬀective internal board monitoring. Khanna
and Poulsen supply two alternative explanations. The first one is that
managers of poorly performing companies may voluntarily resign in
order to avoid shareholder lawsuits. The second one is that company
boards may replace the managers of poorly performing firms even if
those managers are not responsible for the bad financial situation of
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a company. Under neither of these two scenarios would a change in
management necessarily be expected to induce improvements in perfor-
mance.
In contrast to the above-mentioned results, Warner, Watts, andWruck
(1988) provide empirical evidence of negative market reaction to forced
managerial resignations. A possible reason for this is, according to
Warner, Watts, and Wruck, the fact that the announcement of a forced
resignation is interpreted as a signal of worse current and future firm’s
performance. This finding was later confirmed by Mahajan and Lum-
mer (1993), who also documented a significant negative reaction over a
two-day-period, starting one day before the announcement release.
The second very important topic of research is non-conflictual resig-
nations and their impact on stock prices (see e. g. Mahajan and Lummer
1993). The conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is that the
announcements of resignations on a non-conflictual basis are accompa-
nied by a decline in stock prices. This means that such announcements
are interpreted by market participants as a loss of valuable human cap-
ital by a firm. Resignations due to the retirement by managers need to
be analysed separately from other non-conflictual resignations. The lat-
ter can usually be well anticipated, and as a consequence, no stock price
reaction should be observed. The empirical work of Weisbach (1988) and
Mahajan and Lummer (1993) provides support for this statement. In ad-
dition, forced resignations and normal retirements also exhibit a signifi-
cant amount of post turnover corporate asset-restructuring sales, layoﬀs,
cost-cutting measures and so on.
In this paper we provide an empirical analysis of announcements
about the resignation of board members which took place in the compa-
nies listed on the primary market of the Warsaw Stock Exchange (wse).
Poland is a representative case for event study in an emerging stock mar-
ket due to the Polish experience in the establishment and development of
a stock market. The stock market in Poland did not exist, practically, un-
til the beginning of 1990s. The wse, the only stock exchange in Poland,
became operational in April 1991. Despite the fact that the period under
consideration is relatively short and comprises only five years, our results
reveal a statistically significant stock price reaction to announcements of
resignations. To be more precise, market reaction is rather positive im-
mediately before the announcement release, and negative over the fol-
lowing six-day-period, starting on the event day. Besides a traditional
examination of abnormal return behaviour, we also check whether or
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not resignation announcements induce increases in the variance of stock
returns over the period under consideration. It turns out that an increas-
ing tendency towards stock return volatility can be observed during the
period prior to an announcement release.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The second section outlines
the methodology that aims at uncovering the anomalous behaviour of
stock prices induced by an event. The third contains a brief description
of the data and the rules underlying sample selection procedure. In the
fourth section we start with some basic descriptive analysis of the ab-
normal return series, and then the test results for the significance of an
event eﬀect over the period under consideration are presented. The last
Section provides a summary of the main findings, comments and some
guidelines for future research.
Methodology
Over thirty years ago Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) introduced
event study methodology which still seems an unbeatable tool for un-
covering stock price as well as trading volume reactions to the arrival of
new information. Obviously, the methods that are used now under event
study diﬀer from those of Fama et al. but the main idea has remained the
same over the whole period since this methodology was introduced.
Let Π be the set of day indices t belonging to an event window, and Ω
be a set of day indices t which are attributed to a pre-event or observation
window. As a first step, stock prices (Pt) are transformed into returns
(Rt) by means of a discreet or continuous formula. The latter, which is
given by
Rt = log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
,∀t ∈ Π ∪ Ω, (1)
is especially popular due to the well-known fact that return series (1)
is better approximated by normal. In addition, the use of a continuous
formula usually improves the stationarity properties of the return series
(stabilizing the stock return variance with respect to time).
As a second step, the abnormal return series (ARt) is obtained by sub-
tracting the actual return from the expected return
ARt = Rt − E[Rt |Rk∈Ω],∀t ∈ Π. (2)
Note that the expected return in (2) is conditional on the returns ob-
served over the pre-event window. The most popular model for gener-
ating expected returns is the market model (mm) introduced by Sharpe
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(1963). This model shows the expected return as the sum of two com-
ponents. The former is a constant (α). The latter, is a product of the
systematic-risk parameter and the market-portfolio return (βRm). With
mm serving as an expected return model, (2) may be rewritten as
ARt = Rt − αˆ − βˆRm,t ,∀t ∈ Π, (3)
where αˆ and βˆmean the estimators of the corresponding model param-
eters applied over the pre-event window.
In order to check whether the average abnormal return on a given day
t ∈ Π statistically diﬀers from zero the t-statistic is employed, which is
given by
tstat =
N−1
∑N
i=1 ARi,t
σˆAAR
, (4)
where N stands for the number of firms included in the sample and the
denominator (the standard deviation of the average abnormal returns)
can be calculated as follows
σˆAAR = N
−1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ 1¯¯Ω − 1
∑
t∈Ω
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
N∑
i=1
ARi,t − 1¯¯Ω
∑
t∈Ω
N∑
i=1
ARi,t
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
1
2
, (5)
where ¯¯Ωmeans a cardinal number of set Ω.
With the widely-documented fact that financial time series exhibit
heteroscedasticity of variance, the use of a market model as in (3) does
not seem to be fully justified. The estimator of the standard deviation of
the average abnormal returns defined by (5) is not able to capture vari-
ance changes whichmay occur over the event window. As a consequence,
the value of statistic (4) is no longer suﬃcient for the purpose of infer-
ence needs.
To relax the assumption that stock return variance remains the same
on each day of the event window, while improving the statistical infer-
ence used under event study, has resulted in the development of several
helpful techniques. One of them is that of Hilliard and Savickas (2000).
An original test for abnormal performance is proposed by Hilliard and
Savickas with the market model and the garch(1,1) error term. Under
this study we, however, decided to use the generalized arma(r,m)-mm-
garch(p,q) model given by
Ri,t = Φi,0 +
r∑
j=1
Φi,jRt−j + βiRm,t + εi,t +
m∑
j=1
Θi,jεi,t−j, εi,t ∼ (0, hi,t).
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hi,t = αi,0 +
q∑
j=1
αi,jε
2
t−j +
p∑
j=1
ωi,jht−j. (6)
The proper length of time-lags in the model is identified using the
Akaike Information Criterion. The model parameters are estimated by
means of the ml-method from observations included within the pre-
event window, i. e. for t ∈ Ω.
The test statistic (lt) can be expressed as
lt =
ASRt√∑N
i=l(SRi,t − ASRt)2
(N − 1), (7)
where SRi,t = ARi,t
√
1/hˆi,t and ASRt = N−1
∑N
i=1 SRi,t .
In order to test the implications of announcements over any sub-
period of the event window whose boundaries are set asm and s (m < s),
the standardized cumulative abnormal return can be calculated
SCARi,m,s =
∑s
t=m ARi,t√∑s
t=m hˆi,t
. (8)
The corresponding test statistics are given by
lCARm,s = ASCARm,s
√
N(N − 1)∑N
i=1(SCARi,m,s − ASCARm,s)2
, (9)
where ASCARm,s = N−1
∑N
i=1 SCARi,m,s.
With the help of the methodology proposed by Hilliard and Savickas
(2002) we are also able to study the event eﬀect on the unsystematic
volatility of stock returns. The multiplicative abnormal volatility param-
eter (λ), introduced by the above-mentioned authors, measures the scale
of the increase in unsystematic volatility, caused by an event. This pa-
rameter is defined as
λˆt = (N − 1)−1
N∑
i=1
(
ARi,t − N−1 ∑Nk=1 ARk,t)2
N−1(n − 2)hˆi,t + N−2∑Nk=1 hˆk,t . (10)
Note that if parameter (10) is equal to unity, the event has no impact
on unsystematic volatility. A value of the parameter greater than one im-
plies a volatility increase due to the event. To test it more formally, one
can use a statistic expressed as
St = (N − 1)λˆt , (11)
which is a chi-squared distribution with N − 1 degree of freedom.
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Analogically, to check the same for a given sub-period of the event
window statistic (11) may be modified as follows
CSm,s = (N − 1)
s∑
t=m
λˆt . (12)
This statistic also has a chi-squared distribution with (N−1)(s−m+1)
degree of freedom.
Sample Description
Our sample consists of announcements of board member resignations
collected from the online database constructed by Parkiet from arti-
cles and news published, among others, by Parkiet Newsroom, pap and
Reuters. The number of items included in this database exceeds 400,000.
Therefore, we first searched the database for announcements of inter-
est using several diﬀerent keywords. Afterwards, each of the filtered an-
nouncements was read carefully in order to make sure that the infor-
mation conveyed by the announcement was clear enough and met our
selection requirements (we talk about them in more detail below).
One important problem when addressing managerial resignations
stems from the fact that the true motives underlying a resignation deci-
sion are not always given. As a result, the boundary between forced and
non-conflictual resignations is rather vague. To ensure that our sample
consisted only of informative managerial resignations, we left out any
resignation as a consequence of retirements by the managers if it took
place at the normal retirement age, or at the expiry of a contract.
The period of study was from January 2000 to June 2005, and the com-
panies which we took into account were those which are listed on the
primary market of the wse. There are all together sixty announcements
of board member resignation that satisfied two major selection criteria.
Firstly, the use of event study methodology made it necessary to iden-
tify an unambiguous event date for the resignation decision. This event
date is, under this study, the day on which such a decision is first an-
nounced to the public. As a consequence, all news that only repeated the
same information has been not taken into account. Secondly, the event
must be adequately isolated, so the chosen eleven-day-period (the event
window) centred on the event day (t = 0) should not be aﬀected by any
other firm-related events (confounding events). This made it necessary
to exclude from the sample all those announcements that took place at
the same time as other firm-related events.
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The stock price data were provided by Parkiet, which compiles a
database on the Polish stock market. Based on these data we obtain daily
return series for each stock included in our sample, and the return on the
stock index wig which is a market-capitalization stock index, weighted
and adjusted for cash dividends.
Empirical Results
abnormal return
We start our investigation with some basic descriptive analysis and a sim-
ple test of abnormal returns over the event window. First, for each event
included in the sample market model parameters (α and β) were esti-
mated on the basis of the return series from a two-hundred-day-period,
ending on the sixth day before the event day (t = 0). Then, abnormal
returns (3) were computed. The descriptive statistics for the abnormal
returns as well as the t-statistic (4) are reported in table 1.
The sample mean abnormal return is rather erratic in terms of both
sign and size over the event window. It ranges from –1.068% on the third
day after the announcement release to 1.507% two days before that day. It
is also worth emphasizing that over the sub-period prior to the event day
the mean abnormal return reveals a trend towards positive values, while
after the announcement release one can observe rather the reverse ten-
dency. The minimum and maximum values of abnormal returns show
huge variability of event eﬀect across the firms included in the sample.
The high values of the sample standard deviation of abnormal returns
appears to confirm that information about managerial resignation di-
versely aﬀected stock prices across the sample. In the whole event win-
dow, on the other hand, the sample standard deviation is fairly stable
and ranges from 2.9% (for t = −1) to 7.4% (for t = 2). Finally, the ab-
normal return series display excess kurtosis and are skewed to the left,
except for three cases (t = −2,+1,+4) where the skewness is positive. In
all days within the event window, except for the last one the kurtosis is
substantially larger than 3, but again one can notice that the largest val-
ues are observed over the second part of the event window (from t = 0
to t = +4).
With regard to the t-Student statistic, we observe a statistically signif-
icant value in three cases. The first time when the test statistic is diﬀer-
ent from zero, at a 1% level of significance, is two days before the an-
nouncement release. The corresponding mean abnormal return is posi-
tive and equals 1.51%. The two other cases where one can identify a sig-
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table 1 Descriptive and t-Student statistic of abnormal returns
within the event window
Day t Descriptive statistics t-statistic
Minimum
(%)
Mean
(%)
Maximum
(%)
Std. dev.
(%)
Skew-
ness
Ex-
kurtosis
–5 –11.002 –0.595 11.071 4.095 –0.165 1.960 –1.165
–4 –23.079 0.042 13.952 5.549 –1.469 7.628 0.083
–3 –21.384 –0.547 13.304 4.619 –2.030 9.642 –1.070
–2 –6.521 1.507 20.019 5.025 2.040 4.593 2.950**
–1 –11.547 0.056 7.410 2.914 –1.250 5.042 0.110
0 –40.155 –1.006 9.714 6.678 –3.770 20.285 –1.969*
+1 –20.368 0.164 27.007 5.171 1.349 15.442 0.321
+2 –42.658 –0.184 20.254 7.404 –2.906 19.460 –0.361
+3 –41.490 –1.068 10.603 6.296 –4.508 29.276 –2.089*
+4 –8.602 0.757 35.096 5.725 3.776 21.733 1.482
+5 –9.208 –0.824 5.275 3.232 –0.663 –0.021 –1.613
notes ** Statistically significant value at 1% level, * stat. significant value at 5% level.
nificant event eﬀect include the event day itself and the third day after
that day. In both of them the mean abnormal return is negative and, re-
spectively, amounts to –1.01% and –1.07%. It can be concluded from the
figures that managerial resignation announcements cause stock prices to
increase immediately before the oﬃcial announcement, but then stock
prices start to fall. Further, the decrease in stock prices not only com-
pletely cancels the previous increase, but also continues below the price
level which could be assumed under non-event conditions.
The use of the market model as in (3) produces only a rough approx-
imation of the true event eﬀect due to the assumptions underlying the
ols method of estimation of model parameters, including homoscedas-
ticity and non-correlation of the error term. It is a well-documented
fact that stock return series exhibit time-varying variance and are usu-
ally auto-correlated. In this context the promising nature of a garch
approach is obvious.
Therefore, as a second stage, we estimated the model (6), using the
same estimation window as previously for the market model. After con-
trolling formodel misspecifications, we continue to evaluate event eﬀects
associated with managerial resignations by obtaining the standardized
abnormal return series, and then by calculating the standardized cumu-
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figure 1 Abnormal returns and volatility within the event window
(garch approach)
lative abnormal return (8) as well as the corresponding test statistic (9)
over the seven periods of the event window.
Figure 1 presents the standardized abnormal returns, cumulative ab-
normal returns and conditional volatility generated by means of the
model (6) over the event window. Taking the variance of stock re-
turns into consideration does not change fundamentally our inferences
about abnormal return behaviour in the whole event window. Again one
can find that negative standardized abnormal returns are generally dis-
tributed in the second half of the event window (for t ≥ 0). The shape
of the line representing cumulative abnormal return fully supports this
finding. As regards the conditional volatility of stock returns, one can
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table 2 Test results for event eﬀect within sub-periods of the event window
Time interval {m,s}
{–5,–1} {–3,–1} {–2,–1} {0,+2} {0,+3} {0,+5} {–5,+5}
ASCARm,s 0.033 0.729 1.564* –1.781 –3.126** –3.229** –3.196
lCARm,s 0.017 0.602 1.932 –1.598 –2.347 –2.093 –1.170
notes ** Statistically significant value at 5% level, * stat. significant value at 10% level.
notice a slow rise in variance in the second half of the event window.
This observation, however, is not equivalent to saying that an event-
induced shift in variance can be identified. We address this issue in the
next section.
Table 2 reports the test results for the event eﬀect in the seven diﬀer-
ent periods of the even window. Statistically significant values of average
standardized cumulative abnormal returns (ascar) can be found in the
case of three sub-periods of the event window, including the period from
day t − 2 to day t − 1, from the event day to day t + 3, and finally from the
event day to the last day within the window. In the whole event window
the ascar is negative (–3.196), but its value does not diﬀer from zero
from a statistical point of view.
What can be concluded from the figures in table 2? Firstly, the negative
valuation eﬀect in the second half of the event window clearly indicates
that companies, on average, lost valuable human capital because of the
resignation of board members. This finding is consistent with our in-
tuition and corroborates other empirical evidence, e. g. that of Mahajan
and Lummer (1993). Secondly, the positive valuation eﬀect before the
oﬃcial announcement of managerial resignations may be, on the other
hand, interpreted as evidence that a resignation results in conflict reduc-
tion inside the company, as a consequence of which stock prices start to
increase.
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that prior to an of-
ficial announcement about a resignation there is trading by insiders. In-
siders are well informed and probably know the true circumstances of
a resignation decision. They may be convinced that the resignation of a
given person will ultimately lead to improved performance. After the of-
ficial announcement other investors start to trade. They are not as well
informed as insiders and have to guess the true reasons for a resignation.
From their view-point a resignation means a loss of the firm’s human
capital.
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table 3 Test results for cumulative abnormal volatility within sub-periods of the
event window
Time interval {m,s}
{–5,–1} {–3,–1} {–2,–1} {0,+2} {0,+3} {0,+5} {–5,+5}∑s
t=m λˆt 13.485* 5.229* 2.934* 0.931 0.968 0.977 14.462*
CSm,sx10 68.776 26.670 14.964 4.779 4.934 4.983 73.758
notes * Statistically significant value at 10% level.
testing for the event effect on the unsystematic
volatility
Finally, for the same periods of the event window as previously, we cal-
culate the multiplicative abnormal volatility parameter (10) and the cor-
responding test statistic (12). The results are summarized in table 3.
We found an increasing tendency towards volatility in the cumulative
abnormal returns over the first half of the event window (i. e. for t < 0).
In the second half of the window (i. e. for t ≥ 0) volatility is not changed.
This can be seen as evidence that before the information about a resig-
nation becomes public the market reacts more nervously. The volatility
increase here may be a result of uncertainty about the possible resigna-
tion.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the announcement of res-
ignations of board members conveys valuable information in an emerg-
ing stock market like the Polish one. Using a variant of event study
methodology, we provide empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis
of market reaction to managerial resignations. Before the announcement
release there is a tendency towards an increase in stock prices. When the
firm announces the resignation of members of the board, this tendency
is reversed, and stock prices start to fall.
In order to explain this phenomenon we have referred to diﬀerences in
the interpretation of a resignation announcement by insiders and other
investors operating on the wse. Insiders, who know the true motives
behind a resignation decision, are prone to buy shares. It may be they
expect that a resignation, by reducing conflict and/or improving man-
agement, will result in better firm performance. With the limited infor-
mation in an oﬃcial announcement, other market participants have to
guess what the resignation means for the current and future position of
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table 4 Companies included in the sample and the number of identified events
Name of company n Name of company n
4media 2 Naftobudowa 3
7bulls.com 1 Netia 1
Agora 1 Optimus 1
Agros 1 Orfe 2
Amica Wronki 1 Pekao 2
Apexim 1 Pfleiderer Grajewo 1
Bank Millennium 3 Pollena Ewa 1
Bre Bank 2 ppwk 1
Centrozap 2 Projprzem 1
Comarch 2 Prokom Software 3
Elektrim 1 Redan 1
Energomontaz˙-P. 1 Softbank 2
Espebepe 1 Ster-Projekt 3
Ferrum 1 Szeptel 1
Fortis Bank Polska 1 tim 1
Getin 1 Tonsil 1
Impel 1 Tras Tychy 1
Interia.pl 1 Wólczanka 2
Kruszwica 1 zm Duda 1
Leta 1 zpc Mieszko 1
Mostostal Zabrze 2 zpue 1
Mostostal-Export 1
notes n – the number of events.
a firm. As our results show, resignations are regarded as a loss of valu-
able human capital. Hence, stock prices tend to go down over the period
following the announcement.
It would be very interesting to check whether stock prices react dif-
ferently to forced and non-conflictual resignations (e. g. normal retire-
ment). It would be also interesting to find out the relative importance
of diﬀerent factors which cause forced resignations, such as blockholder
pressure, takeover attempts, financial distress, shareholder lawsuits or
normal board monitoring. With the meagre sample, we cannot do so
under this study. Therefore, we must leave this problem for future re-
search.
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